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INTRODUCTION

The fiscal policies of any community are a vital part of its operations.
The greater public interest, except in times of depression, centers on what
is to be paid for publicly, who is to pay for it, and in what shares. A
distinct, yet closely related and equally important policy issue is whether
to pay at the time or pay later. With state constitutional revision again
to the fore,' some of the current discussion naturally turns to constitutional regulation of debt financing.
* The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Miss M. L. Brewer, Treasurer of
the City of West Palm Beach, Florida, and past president (1965) of the Florida Chapter of
the Municipal Finance Officers Association for her assistance in gathering much of the basic
research material utilized herein. A copy of each source referred to in this paper is on file
in the Baron de Hirsh Meyer Law Library at the University of Miami School of Law, Coral
Gables, Florida.
**Member, Florida and American Bars; City Attorney, West Palm Beach, Florida
(1960-63);

Chairman, Municipal Law Committee of the Florida Bar (1964-65);

partner

in Warwick, Paul and Herring, West Palm Beach.
***Member, Florida and Amerircan Bars; Associate Professor of Political Science, University of West Florida; formerly Professor of Law, University of Florida and faculty
advisor to University of Florida Law Review; Rhodes Scholar.
1. For many months, under the able leadership of Chesterfield H. Smith, former
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As might well be expected, disagreement exists. Are the existing provisions outmoded when considered in relation to Florida's economy of
today? Should all constitutional restrictions be eliminated? Or should
more be added? If so, what should the limitations be at the state level,
at the county level, at the municipal level, and at the level of those overlapping areas usually called "special districts"? Should the limitations
vary with the level? Should the limitations be substantive, procedural, or
both? What types of measurement should be used in setting these limitations and, in any event, to what extent should they go into the constitution?
In attempting comments on some of these problems certain facts
and figures not normally connected with a strict legal approach are
important. Comparisons with federal debt financing and with debt financing in other states are helpful. On the other hand, Florida's own history
is important because the constitutional provisions here discussed are
viewed with an eye to Florida. What another state finds good or bad in
practice is not necessarily the answer for Florida. As Holmes observed
in his great treatise:
The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.
...

In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been,

and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult history, and existing theories of legislation.'
Similarly, in order to decide whether a change is desirable we must first
ascertain what the law is. What it should be necessarily involves, in turn,
an analysis of what it was, what it is, and what effects it has produced.
Some of the popular statements glibly repeated by statesmen and
jurists, as well as by laymen, are worthy of analysis. Most of these statements are partial truths, or at least they have enough basis within a
particular frame of reference to be rated by many as axiomatic. Yet few
if any will stand up under thorough scrutiny and not one of them is
completely accurate. Some are more nearly false than true. Accordingly,
we later examine some of these stock remarks which masquerade as principles beyond challenge.
II.

DEFINITIONS

Although for reasons of space it is impossible to undertake an
explanation of the innumerable technical terms commonly used in public
bond financing,' a few basic definitions relating directly to this discussion
president of the Florida Bar, a commission of outstanding persons from various walks of
life has been working energetically on a proposed revision of the entire state constitution.
Their recommendations will be carefully considered by the Florida Legislature, whose proposal will go to the electorate for adoption or rejection, FLA. CONST. art. XVII.
2. THE CommoN LAW 1 (1881).
3. Clear and accurate explanations of the terms most commonly used appear in INVEST-
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should prove helpful, particularly in view of the general confusion in
Florida regarding certain of the major distinctions.
A bond is a formal promise in writing and under seal to repay a
certain sum of money at a fixed time to a specified party or to its holder,
and to pay interest at a designated rate at definite periodic intervals.'
A general obligation bond is a bond secured in whole or in part by
pledge of the full faith and credit of the issuing community, including its
power to levy and collect ad valorem taxes on property therein. If a
general obligation bond is subject to some special limitation, such as a
fixed total dollar amount, or a certain percentage of assessed valuation
of real property, or the average of the operating budgets of the community over the past three years, the bond is still a general obligation
bond but is more properly referred to as a limited general obligation
bond. This type of bond is quite common, and in general parlance the
word "limited" is omitted in referring to it; it is lumped with unlimited
general obligation bonds.
A revenue bond is a bond that is secured solely by pledge of the
revenue produced by the facility or facilities for the benefit of which
the bond is issued and its sale proceeds used, that is not secured directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, by a pledge of the issuer's faith and
credit or of any of its taxing powers, including the power to levy or
receive excise taxes, and that does not constitute a lien or encumbrance,
legal or equitable, on any real property of the issuer or on any of its
personal property other than the revenues pledged to secure payment of
the bond.
A special obligation bond is a bond that is secured in whole or in
part by a pledge of revenues derived from sources other than the facility or
facilities for the benefit of which the bond is issued and its sale proceeds
used, but that is not secured by pledge of the full faith and credit of the
issuing community. A bond secured both by revenues from the facility being
constructed and by one or more of the many taxes other than the ad
valorem tax should be classified as a special obligation bond rather than
a revenue bond, although it is actually a hybrid of the two.
Bonds are sometimes referred to by purpose as well as by source,
for example: capital outlay bonds, housing authority bonds, road and
MENT BANKERS Ass'N OF AMERICA, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, 1-8 (3d ed. 1963)

[hereinafter cited as FUNDAMENTALS].
4. This definition follows closely the one given in The New York Times, Apr. 17, 1966,
§ 11, pp. 5-6 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Times Series]. This section presents a series of short
articles, prepared by members of the Municipal Securities Committee of Investment Bankers
Association of America, with clear definitions and explanations. The best comprehensive
treatise on the legal aspects of bond financing is JONES, THE LAw OF BONDS AND BOND
SECURITIES (4th ed. Bowers 1935). Unfortunately this 3-volume work is out of print, but
several law libraries have copies. It was last supplemented in 1950.
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bridge bonds, and water and sewerage bonds. No further definition of
this type of bond is necessary here, but note that the two classifications
should not be used interchangeably.
Bonds are also classified by certain structural characteristics. Such
terms as serial issues, serial maturities, callable at a premium, and callable without premium are used, but the definitions of these terms are
likewise unnecessary here.
III. SKETCH OF FLORIDA BOND HISTORY

Investors and Florida taxpayers, especially the owners of homes and
other immovable property, have both endured some bitter experiences in
debt financing .These were more bitter for the real property taxpayers,
since most of the issues in default were eventually paid off at their expense. As far back as 1841, following the 1837 national depression,
Florida's excessive borrowing for unsuccessful internal improvements
was the major factor in causing the state to default and finally to repudiate four million dollars of bonded debt; only three other states utilized
this means of escape.5
Later, the gross mismanagement of Florida government by the
carpetbaggers and the relatively "terrific" debt that they foisted on the
state during the so-called "Reconstruction" of 1865-1876 marks another
period of bond troubles." Although the present constitution, adopted in
1885, set tight limits on incurring state debt7 it left the local governments
in a position to use public bond financing heavily for whatever the courts
would uphold as "a public purpose." The local governments accordingly
had a field day in later years.
To those of us who experienced it,' the boom of the early twenties
was certainly not worth the debacle that started in the late twenties and
continued into the thirties.' Florida led the nation in number of school
taxing districts in default, placed third in the reclamation and irrigation
district default race, lapped the field in the county default event, and
also pulled handsomely ahead in the defaulting cities and towns event.
In short, Florida won the national grand championship with points to
spare.' °
5. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT 7-8 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as HEINS].
6. DovELL, FLORIDA 569-570 (1952) [hereinafter cited as DOVELL]. For a thorough and
delightfully written survey of this period, with detailed analysis of a mass of supporting
data, see chapters XIV-XV.
7. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 6-10.
8. Mr. Herring wishes it distinctly understood that he is not in this age bracket.
9. See DovFz=, supra note 6, ch. XVIII, for detailed analysis and interpretation.
10. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDs 24-27, 83-87 (1936) [hereinafter cited as HILLHOUSE].
This treatise, written by the Director of Research, Municipal Finance Officers' Ass'n, was
printed in 1936. Unfortunately it is out of print. As stated in its Preface, it is a "study in
pathology," emphasizing the mistakes from the historical and administrative standpoint.
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After that horse had left the barn for good and won his race, the
legislature and the electorate closed the door part of the way on local
issuance of general obligation bonds." The objectionable feature was not
so much that they placed an inequitable share of the total tax load on
the real property owner, but rather that they placed the entire load of
the risk on him alone. 2 Now, however, that another horse has joined the
stable, in the form of recovery and state prosperity (except in some of
the rural areas),' 3 one again hears the cry that it is time to reopen the
barn door.
The 1930 amendment did not attempt to stop public spending, and
indeed it has not done so. But it did attempt to stop imposing the entire
risk on the real property owner unless he consented to shoulder all of it
by so voting. The result has been extensive use of revenue bonds and
special obligation bonds for debt financing in Florida. The security underlying these bonds places some of the risk on the investor 4 and spreads
the bulk of it among taxpaying homeowners, non-taxpaying homeowners,' 5 and non-homeowners. The tax burden, as distinct from the risk
burden, is proportional to the taxpayer's use of the facility for which the
revenue bond is issued. As regards special obligation bonds, the tax varies
with the amount of the taxed item that the user of it purchases; if he
can afford to buy a lot of it, he can afford to pay more tax. The important
point is, however, that when those who voted in the tax, or their elected
representatives that voted it in, decide to abandon what they later regard
as a sinking ship, they do not place the taxpaying homeowners in the
dilemma of having to save the ship by themselves or sink with it.' 6
Because of the scarcity of this reference, we note, from pp. 7, 25, 26, that as of Jan. 1,
1936 bond defaults had already occurred in 47 out of Florida's 67 counties, in 204 out of
its 514 municipalities, in 79 out of its reclamation, levee, irrigation, and drainage districts,
and in 28 of its special assessment districts, for a total default record of 621. The nearest
other states on total figures were Arkansas with 290 defaults, Louisiana with 256, North
Carolina with 250, Texas with 247, Michigan with 217, and California with 184.
11. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
12. The practical effect of this ultimate liability, contingent but painfully definite, is
usually not felt until "good times" have spun though their inevitable cycle into relatively
bad times, at which period any single group of taxpayers in the community is least able
to carry the entire load.
13. It is doubtful whether many of these rural citizens, with their solid sense of values
in life and their way of living, would have realized their supposed plight without the recent
federal enlightenment. By federal standards the average Florida single citizen does not get
enough to live on. The per capita income released Apr. 24 by the U.S. Commerce Department is only 2,547 dollars for 1964, but this figure still places Florida 28th among the
50 states. See The Palm Beach Post, Apr. 25, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
14. We call attention to the fact that no one has presented a single argument, other than
alleged increased cost to the borrower, in support of the notion that the investor should not
bear some of the risk. As a practical matter he is surely better informed on the nature and
value of the security underlying the bond issue than is the local taxpaying homeowner on
what his ultimate tax liability will be.
15. The word "non-taxpaying" is here used with relation to the property tax. The
exempt freeholder (who need not even be the head of a family) pays other types of taxes,
just as the non-exempt freeholder does, but he bears no risk.
16. We discuss later, on the basis of the incomplete Florida figures available, whether
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The legal history of Florida public bond financing would not be
complete without calling attention to the fact that the stringent 1885
restrictions on issuance of bonds by the state are not the only provisions
ever used by Florida. Article XII, section 7, of the Constitution of 1868
authorized the legislature to issue state bonds "for securing the debt of
the state and for the erection of state buildings, support of state institutions, and perfecting of public works." In other words, the 1885 change
was necessarily deliberate, regardless of whether one believes that it
was wise. It is evident that the strictness of the limitation has resulted in
later constitutional amendments, the use of special state agencies, and
the arrangements for leasing and paying rent that have come into being
since 1885. Florida bond history points up the need to consider seriously,
at this time, the advisability of liberalizing state bond issuance to meet
capital outlay for state highways, the state university system, and state
office buildings, including expansion of the Capitol itself, and other
projects definitely "state" in nature (in that they are not susceptible to
financing by local governmental agencies).
IV.

MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO PUBLIC BONDS

Florida has many constitutional provisions relevant to public bond
financing. Patterson summarized these in 1953 in a thorough historical
and analytical survey" covering not only municipal bonds but also those
of other governmental agencies in Florida and those of the state itself.
Although few major changes have occurred since the publication of his
article, the passage of time requires a new examination of the law in this
field. As practicing attorneys know and as laymen discover to their sorrow after proceeding on an uninspired reading of constitutional and
statutory provisions alone, these provisions mean in practice what our
supreme court says they mean at any given time. Arriving at accurate
conclusions demands careful study of the relevant case law.
Fortunately a sound article bringing Patterson largely up to date
has just appeared.' 8 Since these articles are readily available, their dethis major type of bond financing has worked well in Florida, and whether investors have
regarded their assuming a share of the risk in revenue bond financing as worth a substantially higher cost of borrowing.
17. Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing, 6 U. FLA. L. REV.
287 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Patterson]. Giles J. Patterson, former president of the old
Florida State Bar Ass'n, was for years one of Florida's outstanding bonds attorneys and
was recognized by many as the best. The procedural aspects of the bond validation process
under Florida Statutes ch. 75 (1965) is well covered by Messrs. Frank L. Watson and R. G.
Cunningham, Jr., in Chapter 10, Florida Civil Practice After Trial, pages 567-605 (1966).
This chapter explains how the bond validation proceedings should be handled under chapter
75, Florida Statutes and Fla. App. R. 4.3 including forms.
18. Madison, Municipal Short Term Borrowing & Contracts, Fla. Mun. Record, Apr.
1966, p. 8. Despite the title limitation, the author found it necessary to review many supreme
court decisions because, as he points out, FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6 makes no distinction
between short-term borrowing and long-term borrowing. William M. Madison is city
attorney of Jacksonville, a position he has held with distinction for many years.
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tailed analyses will not be repeated; rather, this article will confine itself
to the summary approach, filling in the few gaps that remain.
The major constitutional provisions on public bond financing appear
in Article IX, sections 2, 6, 7, and 10.19
Certain tax provisions, though not express regulations of bond
financing, are nevertheless relevant. These are the provisions directing
the legislature to authorize counties and incorporated municipalities to
assess and impose taxes for county and municipal purposes only, granting
to owners of homestead realty an exemption from all taxation, except
assessments for special benefits, up to an assessed valuation of 5,000
dollars, exempting from taxation real property to the assessed value of
500 dollars for every widow and every bona fide resident of Florida that
has lost a limb or become disabled in war or by misfortune, exempting
from taxation the household goods and personal effects to the value of
500 dollars owned by a family residing in this state, and exempting by
negative wording all property held and used exclusively for religious,
scientific, municipal, educational, literary, or charitable purposes.2 Bond
financing is also practically affected by the constitutional prohibition of
state income tax and the prohibition of any state inheritance or estate tax
19. The portion of § 2 which is relevant here reads:
[N]o levy of ad valorem taxes upon real or personal property except intangible
property, shall be made for any state purpose whatsoever ...
This 1940 amendment in effect bars the state from pledging real property taxing power; the
state lacks this taxing power itself.
Section 6 reads:
The Legislature shall have power to provide for issuing State bonds only for the
purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing insurrection, and the Counties, Districts,
or Municipalities of the State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after
the same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in
which a majority of the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such
Counties, Districts or Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the manner to
be prescribed by law; but the provisions of this act shall not apply to the refunding
of bonds issued exclusively for the purpose of refunding of the bonds or the
interest thereon of such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities.
Section 7 reads:
No tax shall be levied for the benefit of any chartered company of the State, nor
for paying interest on any bonds issued by such chartered companies, or by counties,
or by corporations, for the above-mentioned purposes.
Section 10 reads:
The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned to any individual, company,
corporation or association; nor shall the State become a joint owner or stock-holder
in any company, association or corporation. The Legislature shall not authorize
any county, city, borough, township or incorporated district to become a stockholder
in any company, association, or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money
for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or individual.
20. The provisions referred to appear respectively in FLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 5; art. X,
§ 7; art. IX, §§ 9, 11; and art. XVI, § 16. We also call attention to the landmark case
Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930), which held that state taxes must be used
for state purposes, county taxes for county purposes, municipal taxes for municipal purposes, and special district taxes for special district purposes. See the discussion in Patterson,
supra note 17, at 294-297. As regards the personalty exemption to a resident family head,
the legislature in 1955 increased the exempted amount from $500 to $1,000, by FLA. STAT.
§ 192.201 (1965).
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amounting to more, in state and federal tax combined, than the federal
tax alone would be without the complementary state tax. 2'
A few major exceptions have been made to the basic principles
originally laid down. These have been effected, as they should be, by
constitutional amendment. The exceptions are: the levy of two cents per
gallon on gasoline and the appropriation of the proceeds to retire county
and district road bonds issued prior to July 1, 1931, with the surplus
available for road and bridge construction; the appropriation of motor
vehicle license tax proceeds to finance public school outlay and the
retirement of bonds issued for this purpose; the grant of authority to
the legislature to provide for special tax school districts and for the
issuance of bonds by them for public free school use, subject to certain
procedural and substantive limitations; the later authorization to the
legislature to determine by law the apportionment and distribution of
state appropriations to the county boards of public instruction; and the
1963 amendment creating the capital outlay and debt services trust fund
for institutions of higher learning and junior colleges, appropriating
thereto the revenue from gross receipt tax proceeds collected from every
person, including municipalities, receiving payment for electricity, gas,
use of telephones, and sending of telegrams.22
Finally, there are such relatively minor provisions as those authorizing issuance of revenue bonds to acquire land and equipment for outdoor
recreation promotion; the exemption of motor vehicles (including since
the 1965 amendment all trailers not permanently affixed to the land)
from all outdoor taxation other than the state operational license tax;
and the now expired exemption of taxation for a certain period on realty
used by new industrial plants and motion picture studios.23
V. COMPARISONS

State, county, and municipal bond financing in the United States
has a long history. Some of it is disappointing but most of it is commendable, at least from the investor's standpoint.24 In 1690 the Colony
of Massachusetts, faced with mutiny by its soldiers and sailors, who were
then fighting the French, floated successive issues totaling 40,000 pounds
in five-shilling bills of credit. Drafting and printing expenses were
minimal; the instrument consisted of 61 words. It was issued by order
of the "General Court," bore no interest, had no maturity date in the
earlier issues, and was not legal tender; but it was stated to be "in value
21. FLA. CONST. art IX, § 11.
22. These provisions appear respectively in FLA. CONST., art. IX, § 16, and in art. XII,
88 18, 17, 9 (and 7 to some extent) and 19.
23. These provisions appear respectively in FLA. CoNsT., art. IX, §§ 17, 13, 12, and 14.
Also important is art. IX, § 15, which allows the legislature to distribute to the counties
equally all state excise taxes on the operation of pari-mutuel pools.
24. For a thorough discussion see HiLLOUSE, supra note 10, ch. II.
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equal to money," and the Colony treasurer had to accept it at face value
in "all publick payments" and for any Colony stock in the treasury.25
Though naively conceived when judged by modern standards and not a
bond by strict definition, it served the purpose of a bond.
By 1950 the total of state, territorial, and municipal bonds outstanding exceeded 23 billion dollars; and by 1960 it exceeded 66 billion,
with over three-fourths of the total increase occurring after 1925.26
Today the total is approximately 100 billion dollars. By way of
comparison, the annual cost of local government in the United States
has risen from 8 billion dollars in 1946 to more than 46 billion in 1964,
the recent rate of increase being eight percent a year.28
While the recent "Great Society" budgets of well over 100 billion
dollars annually, without counting social security,29 substantially exceed
the state, county, and municipal annual operating costs, the ratio of
roughly two to one does not warrant the remark, frequently heard of
late, that state and local governments have become unimportant.
A comparison of the relative federal-local ratios of outstanding debt
to annual costs is noteworthy. The federal government runs at a ratio of
three to one, without counting the social security debt, even while imposing a much larger current tax burden on the taxpaying citizens.3 0 The
state and local ratio is only two to one, as the foregoing figures show.
25. LEBENTHAL & CO.,

(1960)

[hereinafter cited as

INC., MUNICIPAL BONDS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR
LEBENTHAL]. This pamphlet is recommended to anyone

6-8
first

approaching the subject of municipal bonds.
26. FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 3, at 25; LEBFNTHAL, supra note 25, at 9.

27. The figures of U.S. Bureau of the Census, reported in the Municipal Finance
Officers' Association News Letter, Jan. 1, 1966, p. 1, show the total of this debt on June 30,
1965 as 98.7 billion dollars, of which all but 6 million was long-term debt. Of the long-term
total, the state debt aggregated 26.2 billion, while that of local governments accounted for
66.5 billion; cf. GOODBODY & Co., THE BOND BUYER'S MUNICIPAL FINANCE STATISTICS, Mar.
1966, p. 26 [hereinafter cited as GOODBODY], INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGER'S ASS'N, THE
MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 231-234 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MUN. YEAR BOOK], N.Y. Times
series, supra note 4, at 3.
28. GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FOUNDATION, INC., STATE
LOCAL BORROWING & PROPERTY TAXING POWERS iii (1965)
publication gives an excellent summary for each state.

CONSTITUTIONAL

RESTRICTIONS ON

[hereinafter cited as GAF]. This

29. This huge additional item, though never officially admitted to be a tax, is from any
practical standpoint an added tax for those who work and therefore have to pay it. Though
the public has been deliberately duped as to these levies by the official reference to social
security payments in such euphemisms as "trust fund" and "old-age insurance," the only
"trust assets" are an I.O.U. from succeeding generations--assuming they will be willing to
demand from themselves the necessary "contributions" and will be able to pay these. Needless to say, the very government that follows this practice would not dream of letting
insurance companies use future premiums owed by their policyholders as their reserves. If
this federal "trust fund" were added to the officially admitted national debt, that debt would

even now be more than double the admitted figure, which presently is conceded to be 325
billion dollars; see FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, THE NATIONAL DEBT 8 (1965).
30. From the Special Report on the Allocation of the Tax Burden and the Benefits of
Government Expenditures by Income Class 25 (1966), prepared by Tax Foundation, Inc.,
a non-profit organization with offices at 50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, as of the 1961

figures.
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This comparison, at the very least, indicates that the state and local
governments have been much more successful in paying as they go and
more conservative both in leaving unpaid remainders as their legacy to
succeeding generations and in superimposing on their own present tax
burden the growing amount of tax proceeds needed merely for interest
on debt."
The state and local governments have attained this result despite
the fact that the bulk of state and local debt has been incurred to meet
part of the cost of building educational facilities, public utilities, and
roads, the useful life of which logically warrants letting their future users
pay some of the installments provided the prospective useful lives of these
facilities are properly calculated from the standpoint of probable obsolescence as well as simple physical deterioration.12 In other words, the
state and local governments have something to show for their expenditures of borrowed funds, yet have borrowed less.
One reason for the disparity in ratios is the fact that state and local
governments are closer to the people, who are able to maintain more effective control of their representatives in government, not only through elections but also through referendums on specific debt issues and through
the opportunity to vote on proposed constitutional amendments or charter
changes. Another reason is that, with a few notable exceptions, 3 the
highest state courts have not shown the ingenuity of their federal counterpart in circumventing constitutional provisions. They have preferred to
let the electorate decide the issue by voting on constitutional amendments.
Many scholarly theorists in the field of local finance are now recommending the complete abolition of restrictions on incurring local government debt, preferring to leave decisions of this nature to the unlimited
discretion of the representatives chosen for local government leadership.
This view is argued, for example, by L. L. Ecker-Racz, Assistant Director, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,34 The underlying philosophy is that "progress in the country's private sector goes
hand-in-hand with an enlarging dependence on governmental programs.""
31. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, THE NATIONAL DEBT 5 (1965),

gives

the 1965 annual figure alone on the national debt as 11 billion dollars; in 1964 the figure
was over 10.7 billion, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESS AND THE NATION 391
(1965). For statistical tables going back to 1791, when the federal debt was 75 million
dollars, see FAIRFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC., THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
720-721 (Rev. ed. 1965).
32. For an analysis of these uses of debt proceeds for all the states see FUNDAMENTALS,
supra note 3, at 24; for Florida see KILPATRICK, DEBT PROBLEMS OF FLORIDA MUNICIPALITIES
12-13 (1953), a pamphlet published by University of Florida Public Administration Clearing Service.
33. E.g., Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938) ; Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
34. Local Tax and Debt Limits-Time for a Change, release of an address delivered
before Section of Local Government Law of A.B.A., August 11, 1964.
35. Id. at 2. The "progress" in the United States in the private sector consists, as of
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Mr. Ecker-Racz points out that between 1952 and 1962 local governments increased their general expenditures from 17 billion to 40 billion
dollars. Of the 23 billion of new current financing, state and federal aid
provided only about one-fourth. They more than doubled their property
tax collections, which accounted for seven out of eight of their new tax
dollars. In addition they increased outstanding debt from 23 billion to
60 billion. The "shackles on local governments," he argues, were imposed
when prudence in the conduct of municipal finances left much to be
desired.36 "Like other relics of bygone days," he continues, "they should
now be relegated to the archives of historical museums;" the improvement in the quality of local government leadership, and the increased
alertness of the public to the conduct of local government affairs justify
allowing local government officials to deal with debt problems in the
fashion that seems best to them.
Professor Heins reaches the same conclusion in recommending that
full borrowing be restored to state legislatures with neither referendums
nor any of the other restrictions currently found in state constitutions.3 7
He reaches this conclusion by another route, however. In particular, he
points to the fact that the states have found ways to circumvent limitations imposed by state constitutions, primarily by the use of revenue
bonds issued by state agencies, by the creation of public corporations and
authorities with substantial borrowing powers, by lease-purchase agreements, and by inter-agency lending within the state.38 He concludes that
if there is no desire to borrow the restrictions are not needed; if a desire
to borrow exists, state legislatures will find a way to do so, regardless
of restrictions.39
The two lines of argument here summarized are difficult to follow
when considered together. On the one hand, the public is urged to trust
its representatives implicitly because of the great improvement in the
leadership placed in office. On the other hand, the public is urged to
remove all restrictions because these leaders cannot be trusted even to
follow the organic law established by the public as the basic framework
of government; restrictions will be circumvented in any event.
Since these two conflicting lines of argument lead to the same conclusion, one might well suspect that something is wrong with the conclusion. Admittedly the huge scientific strides of recent years have
radically changed the conditions under which we live. However, the
1965, of private debt of 882 billion, up 530 percent over 1945; public debt amounts to 418
billion, up 42 percent over 1945; and the total debt is 1.3 trillion, up 199 percent over
1945, and is still growing, "Your Debts: Too Big?" in U.S. News & World Report, June
14, 1965, p. 45.
36. Ecker-Racz, supra note 34, at 4.
37. HEIs, supra note 5, at 87, 90.
38. Id. at 14.
39. See note 37 supra.
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authors would submit that no evidence has been presented to indicate
that human nature has changed drastically, if at all. To many a politician
the soundest investment is still the one that will buy the largest bulk of
votes at the next election. The federal and state governments in this
country have always been based on a democracy that is not only representative in type but also constitutional. At the local level virtually all
municipalities have charters which serve the purpose of a constitution.
Furthermore, as far as Florida is concerned, the facts do not bear
out any contention that provisions setting the limits of governmental
financial activity are necessarily so ineptly drafted as to be ignored by
our state legislature and our judiciary.4"
One of the most useful decision-making tools used in the purchase
of bonds are the ratings accorded them by organizations devoted exclusively to the preparation of such ratings. The symbols used are intended
to give the relative classification of a given bond with regard to safety
of investment. Bonds with the lowest probability of loss of investment
are rated highest. The rating does not purport to indicate probable
market changes; neither does it take into consideration the desirability
to some purchasers of a higher yield or net return. The mechanics of
rating are beyond the scope of this article.4 1
In the United States two major organizations rating state and local
bonds are Moody's Investors Service and Standard and Poor's Corporation. Two of the real experts in this field, whose knowledge is based on
practical as well as theoretical experience, have presented a careful
analyses of the factors that go into a rating, with particular emphasis on
Florida, its bond climate, and its major problems. One analysis was
delivered by Walter H. Tyler, vice President of Standard and Poor's
Corporation, in 1962. Two others were presented in 1960 and 1964 by
David M. Ellinwood, vice president of Moody's and later vice president
of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York.4 2
Mr. Ellinwood in the fall of 1960 compared bond issues for the first
six months of the year in Florida and Connecticut, because both had a
comparable volume of financing during that period. Florida paid an
average interest rate of 4.126 percent which was 27 percent higher than
40. See the later portion of this article beaded

FLORIDA CASE LAW, infra text page 50.
41. The reader desiring to see how ratings are put together can find a brief explanation
in FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 3, at 21-23, as well as in the manuals published by the two
large rating organizations referred to in the text following this note.
42. The Tyler address, Municipal Bond Rating, was presented in 1962 at the 20th
Annual Short Course for Municipal Clerks and Finance Officers at U. of Fla. Ellinwood's
1960 address, Municipal Interest Costs in Florida-Some Whys & Wherefores, appears in
Fla. Munic. Record, Dec. 1960, p. 32; and his 1964 address, Factors in Analyzing Municipal
Credit, was delivered to the Section of Local Gov't Law, A.B.A., August 12, 1964 [hereinafter referred to respectively as Ellinwood 1960 address and Ellinwood 1964 address].
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the Connecticut rate of 3.253 percent. Furthermore, taking both the
interest rate and the repayment schedule into account, the interest over
the life of the debt for every 1,000 dollars borrowed was 841 dollars in
Florida as compared with 335 dollars in Connecticut, or 2 1/2 times
greater. He attributed roughly half of this difference to the rate of debt
ammortization, which was 20.38 years in Florida as against only 10.3 in
Connecticut. The Connecticut issuers, in other words, showed a willingness to pay promptly rather than to leave the debt for future taxpayers.
The factors making up the other half of the difference led Mr. Ellinwood
to analyze the factors going into credit standing, and with very slight
shifts in emphasis Mr. Tyler presented much the same analysis in his
address.
Some factors which tend to lower credit standing are: resort to
refunding, except for the purpose of effecting a net saving in interest
costs; reputation for paying late or not paying at all, including a tendency
to litigate the validity of issues previously validated; unfavorable reputation of other municipalities and districts within the state; reliance entirely
on a seasonal resort economy; booms, especially those due to financing;
improvements for a large anticipated population that has not yet arrived;
appeal to new businesses by offering temporary tax exemptions; appeal to
the "let's get something for nothing" element, as evidenced from an
investor's standpoint by the homestead tax exemption; appeal through
current low tax rate as contrasted with appeal through good basic community facilities and relatively low debt coupled with visible tax sources
as yet untapped; lack of economy in budgets and of careful screening of
spending proposals, frequently forced by irresponsible citizens unwilling
to contribute their share of payment and unwilling to share any of the
risk; frequent budget crises; unequalized assessments; poor record in
collecting taxes; lack of planning, zoning, and subdivision control; relatively heavy debt already outstanding in relation to tax resources (usually
with respect to the ad valorem tax); deficiencies in physical plant, even
as planned, indicating an early need for still further borrowing when
viewed realistically; lack of any coordinated plan for future financing
and lack of any organized borrowing schedule; unwillingness of the state
to help local communities in fiscal difficulties, or even a complete lack of
interest in their problems; evidence of inefficiency and unbusinesslike
management by the local government; and bad public relations, such as
failure to furnish information particularly requested on the fiscal status
of the community, including the bad as well as the good, or a tendency
to furnish deceptive or misleading data.
Conversely, the opposites of these factors would tend to improve
credit standing. No single taxing area has all of these bad features at the
same time, of course, but many a Florida county or municipality has
some of them, and some communities have far too many of them.
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A practical example of one of these factors is analyzed in part of an
excellent and fairly recent study of metropolitan government fiscal
problems in Dade County by Professor Wood. 3 The address and the well
summarized data in it should be read in full, but one point is decidedly
relevant to the instant discussion. Faced with added functions, yet without new taxing powers and without the pre-existing city taxing powers,
the Metro commissioners began the reassessment, completion of which
was required by 1961 according to the Metro Charter, along with equalization of assessed values. Shortly after the reassessment had been completed the storm broke. Some 200,000 protests from irate property
owners, including some 42,000 who had theretofore evaded contributing
anything by reason of low assessments, flooded the county manager's
office.
At the ensuing election adopting the amendment that repealed this
section, the heaviest vote against it occurred in precincts with the lowest
average assessed valuations. In blunt English, they had freeloaded long
enough to acquire the notion that they were an especially privileged class.
One encounters this attitude most acutely in primary and secondary
education, where the viewpoint, accurately stated, appears to be, "Nothing
is too good for my children as long as my neighbor pays most of the cost
and assumes all of the risk. My home is my castle, but his is not." It is
highly doubtful, to say the least, whether citizens of this ilk are desirable
anywhere, but a swarm of parasites can ruin any community if allowed
to impose general obligation debt without accepting any responsibilty for
its payment. By creating a large class of irresponsible freeholders (Florida
is almost unique in this respect among the fifty states) Florida has
seriously crippled itself with respect to utilization of the property tax.
The result has been a shift to revenue bonds and special obligation bonds.
The chief vehicle for debt financing has traditionally been the general
obligation bond, with its pledge of the full faith and credit of the issuer
and with the ultimate liability on the property owner, who cannot move
his property away. This type of bond accounts for half, or perhaps a bit
more than half, of state and local long-term debt," although in most
states it is secured by levy of the tax on all property owners rather than on
only business property, vacant property, and residences above a certain
assessed valuation.45 In Florida, however, revenue and special obligation
43. Metro's Financial Squeeze, an address delivered in 1962 at the 20th Annual Short
Course for Municipal Clerks and Finance Officers. Professor Wood is Chairman of the Dep't
of Government, U. of Miami.
44. N.Y. Times series, supra note 4, at 5-6. HEINS, supra note 5, at 21, places nonguaranteed state debt at 51.1 percent of total debt in 1958, this being the latest year in his
table, as against only 1.3 percent in 1937.
45. For a full analysis of the homestead realty tax exemption see Crosby & Miller,
Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption: V, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 346 (1949).
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bonds now amount to over three-fourths of all municipal
of the state debt of over 764 million dollars47 is guaranteed
of course, because the constitution limits issuance of state
purposes of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection,
operations4 8 concerning bonds long since retired.49

debt. 6 None
by the state,
bonds to the
or refunding

Revenue bonds and other limited obligation bonds are generally
regarded, on a nationwide basis, as being more costly to the issuer than
general obligation bonds." On the other hand, the rating of the bond has
a still greater bearing on the interest rate,51 even as among the Group I
securities,52 to which banks as investors are generally confined by law.
The highest rated bonds obtain the lowest interest rates, 3 as would of
course be expected. Even assuming, however, that non-general obligation
bonds required somewhat higher interest rates on a nationwide basis,
there is little if any evidence that Florida fits into this pattern. So-called
"state" bonds issued by state boards and agencies of Florida are necessarily non-general obligation bonds. Therefore no one can say whether
general obligation bonds would have cost more or less, because no issues
exist for comparison.
It has proved impossible to obtain the figure for the net interest cost
rate for all the state debt of Florida, but the figures which were available
are significant.54 In 1961, when the annual average of the medians of
Moody's top four ratings (Group I) for state and local debt reoffering
yields, on new issues with 20-year maturities, was 3.50 for the year, 5
the Florida average interest cost rate for the 14 million dollars of bonds
issued on behalf of various counties by the Florida Development Commission and the State Board of Education was just under 3.6 percent. 6
The approximately 4 million dollars of 1961 revenue certificates, issued
46. From 1966 preliminary figures soon to appear in a report by the Florida League
of Municipalities.
47. From 1966 figures soon to appear in a report by the Florida Legislative Reference
Bureau.
48. FLA. C ONsT. art. IX, § 6.
49. See Patterson, supra note 17, at 295-296 and n.122.
50. Ellinwood 1960 address, supra note 42, at 34; HEiNS, supra note 5, at 36-68. Professor Hens concludes, id. at 45, that the average interest cost of revenue bonds exceeded
that of general obligation bonds by 0.56 percent in 1957, 0.48 percent in 1958, and 0.66
percent in 1959.
51. FUNDA MALS, supra note 3, at 23, 26.
52. Group I includes Moody's AAA, AA, A, and BAA, and Standard and Poor's AAA,
AA, A, and BBB.
53. FUNDAMENTAIS, supra note 3, at 23.
54. We realize, of course, that these figues are not conclusive as to net interest cost over
the years expressed as a weighted average for all issues and then compared with the same
average for the other states, but they are an improvement on mere speculation.
55. FUNDAmENTALS, supra note 3, at 26.
56. From 1966 figures soon to appear in a report by the Florida Legislative Reference
Bureau.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXI

by what was then called the state board of control for university dormitory and apartment capital outlay, bore an interest cost rate of just
under 3.5 percent. In 1964 and 1965 the 75 million dollars of higher
education bonds issued were sold at an average net interest cost of only
3.286 percent.5 7
Looking at another available comparison, the municipal bond ratings collected from Moody's and Standard and Poor's as of June 1, 1965
show that county and municipal revenue bonds in Florida in most instances rank equal to or higher than general obligation bonds of the same
issues.58
In summary, the data available indicate the unsoundness of the
contention that Florida and its governmental subdivisions are losing
money in substantial sums by financing through non-general obligation
bonds. Revenue bonds and special obligation bonds do a good job for
Florida. Furthermore, though allowing for variation in the tax load, they
place the risk where it belongs, namely, on all the citizens of the community and on the investor. Despite speculation to the contrary, the fact
is that the investor finds these types of bonds attractive, as far as Florida
is concerned.
Another pertinent comparison is the ratio of state and local debt of
all the states to that of Florida. The 1964 national total for state debt
alone was just over 25 billion dollars; for Florida it was 630 million. 9
This figure will seem surprisingly low to anyone not familiar with the
Florida Constitution.6 0 The explanation lies in our intra-state arrangement of debt-financing authority, most of this having been assigned to
counties, municipalities, and special districts.6" The 1964 aggregate local
government long-term debt in the United States was a bit over 67 billion; in Florida, it was 1,877 million.6 2 Of this Florida amount, just over
half represented municipal debt and the remainder was owed by counties
and special districts.63
Although personal per capita income in Florida is the highest in the
Southeast, Florida is still in the lower half of the states. 4 Nevertheless,
based on the 1964 figures just noted, Florida local government debt was
approximately 3.2 percent of the comparable national total. Even when
our relatively low state debt is considered as part of the total, the Florida
57. Ibid.
58. Data published by B. J. Van Ingen & Co., Inc., Miami Branch.
59. GOODBODY, supra note 27, at 26.
60. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
61. See the portion of this article headed MAJOR FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
supra text at page 12.
62. GOODBODY, supra note 27, at 26.
63. See note 46 supra.
64. TAx FOUNDATION, INC., FACTS AND FlcuPxs 46 (13th ed. 1964-1965) 46-47; The
Palm Beach Post Times, Apr. 25, 1966, p. 1, col. 6.
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state and local long-term debt was exceeded at the end of 1964 in only
ten other states, all highly industrialized.6 5
The annual carrying charges on debt have become an increasingly
important factor to consider in recent years. At the federal level, they
cost the taxpayer over eleven billion dollars a year and constitute one of
the highest items in the entire budget. Only defense spending and "welfare" spending still rank ahead of debt interest.6 6 At the state and local
level, by applying an average interest rate of 3.5 percent, the current
interest amount nationally would come to about 3.5 billion dollars, of
which the Florida portion is around 90 million. This amount would,
for example, meet all operating expenses at the 1966-1967 level for the
entire state university system. 5
VI.

SOME POPULAR MYTHS

Before proceeding further it would be well to clear the atmosphere
as to some basic assumptions often made as a predicate to a discussion
of state and local debt (which is erroneously, but frequently, lumped in
a discussion of taxation).
(1) Everyone either pays an ad valorem property tax or he pays
some other kind of tax. This assumption is implicit in the contention
that persons owning no realty or tax-exempt realty also pays taxes. This
statement is, of course, true, but the conclusion is a non sequitur. The
property owner pays the other taxes in addition to and not in lieu of the
property tax. He too pays sales tax, and there is no evidence that property
owners, as a class, pay any less sales tax per capita than do those owning
no real property. There is no evidence that property owners are primarily
non-smokers and therefore pay no cigarette tax. There is no evidence that
property owners are primarily non-drinkers and therefore pay no alcoholic beverage tax. The same lack of evidence applies to the ownership
of savings accounts, mortgages, or securities, to the driving of an automobile or truck and the resultant payment of license and gasoline taxes,
and to the numerous minor taxes such as fishing and hunting licenses.
(2) The property owner not only should pay the bulk of local taxes
in the form of this additional tax on property but also should assume
one hundred percent of the risk. This argument is implicit in the very
nature of the ad valorem tax on real property and constitutes the basic
attraction of this tax for the tax gatherers. If a person considers the sales
tax too high, he can buy somewhere else and escape the tax; and the
difficulty of effective collection of the compensating use tax, designed to
65. See note 62 supra.
66. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESS & THE NATION 390 (1965); a study
of the period 1945-1965.
67. See GOODBODY, supra note 27, at 26, for the basis of this computation.
68. From State Budget Commission figures released in April, 1966.
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prevent sales tax evasion, is a fact well known to all collectors. If the:
taxpayer considers the cigarette tax too high, he can cut down on his
smoking or stop altogether. The same argument applies to the alcoholic
beverage tax and to the various types of legalized gambling tax. If he
finds the amusement tax too high, he can watch television or listen to the
radio-or even read a book. In any event, he can always move from the
community and escape the entire burden of a general obligation debt.
The property owner, on the other hand, is anchored to his home,
yet the very factors that would prompt him to leave a particular community, if he could take his home with him, render the home unsalable
at a figure even remotely approaching what it cost him. If he leaves anyway, he loses his home and is fortunate if he can salvage enough from it
to make even a down payment on a home in another community. Everyone else can leave, but he cannot; as a practical matter the property
owners singlehandedly bear the entire risk.
(3) The property owner derives more benefit than anyone else from
community facilities and therefore should pay more, if not all, of the tax
for these facilities. In the first place, there is no evidence to indicate that
the property owner benefits more than others from what are considered
community facilities today, with the possible exception of those few
services traditionally listed as governmental functions, such as fire protection and that portion of police surveillance needed for the protection
of real property as distinct from the protection of life and the assurance
of safety.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, however, that the property owner obtains somewhat greater benefits from the community services, this argument relates to distribution of taxes rather than to distribution of debt risk. Much of the confusion in discussing debt results
from the concentration on who should bear the tax load, rather than on
the relevant issue, namely, who should bear the risk of having to pay
off the debt.
Today in Florida, homes amounting to one-third of the total estimated value of real property are exempt from ad valorem tax, and the
bulk of this amount consists of homes valued for tax purposes at less
than 5,000 dollars.69
(4) A man's home is his castle. This is one of the purest myths ever
foisted on the Florida public, as far as liability for public debt is concerned, yet it pops out in almost every political discussion of the homestead tax exemption. The true homestead exemption, which has nothing
to do with taxation but rather is an immunity from forced sale under
certain circumstances, goes back to the preceding century. To get it one
69. See note 45 supra.
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has to be the head of a family, whereas even a single person living alone
can get the tax exemption. 70 While explanations of the underlying philosophy of the homestead exemption go as far back as the constitution of
1868, one quotation must suffice in an article of this nature. In a passage
relating to the homestead realty and homestead personalty exemptions
from forced sale the Florida court quoted with approval an Alabama
opinion :71
Their obvious purpose is to secure to each family a home and
means of livelihood, irrespective of financial misfortune, and
beyond the reach of creditors; security of the State from the
burden of pauperism, and of the individual citizen from destruction. Such statutes are entitled to a liberal construction ...
As regards the two-thirds of the owners that are not exempt from
real property tax in Florida, nothing could be further from the truth than
the reference to a man's home as his castle. That portion of the assessed
valuation of his home above the 5,000 dollar limit is not exempt from
execution for payment of federal, state, county or municipal taxes levied
on the home. The present constitutional tax exemption of realty was not
adopted until November 8, 1938, and did not become effective until
January 1, 1939. It was intended as a tax measure, but it had the unfortunate collateral result of shifting from all property owners to twothirds of this same group the entire risk of paying off general obligation
bonds.
Furthermore, ever since the "mechanical jurisprudence" decision
of the supreme court in Lersch v. Board of Public Instruction, 2 the freeloader has been entitled to vote shoulder-to-shoulder with the tax-liable
freeholder. In imposing the entire risk of any general obligation bond
payments on the freeholder, the arguments concerning who should pay
the bulk of local taxes have no direct relation to the issue of who should
bear the risk; and the actual fact is that in Florida every "castle" of the
tax-liable freeholder is built on sand.
The practical effect of homestead law today has degenerated to a
complete perversion of the purpose for which this law was originally
enacted. Mr. Chief Justice Randall expressed this philosophy clearly in
Carters Adm'rs v. Carter:
The object of exemption laws is to protect people of limited
means and their families in the enjoyment of so much property
as may be necessary to prevent absolute pauperism and want,
and against the consequence of ill advised promises which their
70. Ibid.
71. Hines v. Duncan, 79 Ala. 112, 114-115, 58 Am. Rep. 580 (1885), quoted by the
court in West Fla. Grocery Co: v. Teutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 229, 77 So. 209, 212
(1917).
72. 121 Fla. 621, 164 So. 281 (1935).
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lack of judgment and discretion may have led them to make,
or which they may have been induced to enter into by the persuasion of others.73
Today the freeholder is not even accorded the opportunity of making
the ill advised promises himself. Ever since the Lersch decision,74 if he
has the misfortune to live in a community with either low assessments
or a large percentage of cheaper residences, this type of promise, involving assumption of the entire risk, may well be transferred exclusively to
him against his will by irresponsible, freeloading neighbors unwilling to
stand behind the result of their vote.
(5) The time to remove restrictions on incurring debt, or perhaps
to eliminate them entirely, is during apparent prosperity. Restrictions are
unnecessary unless finances get in bad shape. This philosophy, when carefully examined, amounts in plain English to maintaining that the best
time to close the barn door is after the horse has gone. Florida has tried
this approach before, and the practical effect of debt financing for improvements is well known and is still embedded in the memory of a large
number of living Floridians. In the early thirties many a home owner
learned that he had been "improved" right out of his home.
Examined from another angle, this philosophy still makes no sense.
When times are good, the citizens of a community are better able to pay
as they go, or at least more able to resort to debt financing for merely a
part of capital outlay with bonds coming due serially in the fairly near
future. If the citizens cannot pay the cost of the venture in good times,
they certainly cannot do so in bad times. Furthermore, the facilities
obtained by spending the bond proceeds cost more. It is common knowledge that the cost of labor and materials rises in times usually referred
to as good, and that interest rates go higher. Limitation of improvement
expenditures without paying for them is needed more in good times than
in bad.

75

(6) The individual citizen does not have enough intelligence to vote
on matters of finance, the details of which are unavoidably complicated.
If this argument be sound, it proves far too much; it strikes at the very
heart of democracy. If the citizen lacks the intelligence to vote on an issue
squarely presented to him, how can he possibly choose intelligently among
candidates in campaigns involving many important issues, especially
when the candidates agree on some issues, disagree on others, and glibly
avoid taking any position on still others? If the voter can be trusted to
consider all these issues at once, he can certainly be trusted to decide
one of them at a time.
73. 20 Fla. 558, 569 (1884), going back to the homestead realty forced sale exemption
in art. IX of the 1868 constitution.
74. See note 72 supra.
75. See HiLLnousE, supra note 10, at 444-450.
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There is a growing tendency, when considering constitutional representative democracy, to eliminate "constitutional" from consideration,
to belittle and degrade "democracy" and to concentrate almost exclusively on "representative." While it is true that voters have made bad
mistakes on occasion, 76 we maintain that the public is still intelligent
enough to decide what it wants and what it does not want, how much it
is willing to pay, and when to pay which portion of it. We also think that
each member of the public votes more intelligently when he knows that
he is expected to stand behind his decision and that he will be held responsible for his share, not only of the cost but also of the ultimate risk.
At best irresponsibility breeds apathy, and at worst it begets greed and
deliberate malice.
(7) The constitution is a strait-jacket which shackles governmental
bodies and prevents them from prescribing for the citizen what they
know is good for him. No one denies that a constitution is a strait-jacket;
in fact, it is deliberately so designed. It intentionally not only sets up the
organizational structure and some of the procedure for government but
also delineates those areas within which the government may operate or
shall not operate. This strait-jacket is not a casket, however, in which
the political community and its government is buried once and for all.
The underlying implication of branding a constitution as outmoded
or as the dead hand of the past overlooks the fact that every properly
drafted constitution creates a definite amending process by which all or
any portion of it may be changed, if the citizens that created it so desire.
They do, however, reserve to themselves the authority to decide for
themselves whether they want any proposed change. The current Florida
constitution has been amended over 130 times since its original adoption.

Furthermore, a large number of amendments have been proposed to the
electorate and rejected. Whether these individual choices by the elec-

torate were wise or not is beyond the scope of this article; the point
here is that this type of procedure constitutes the basis of constitutional

representative democracy, as distinct from absolute power in the governing body to prescribe for the governed at any time whatever a bare majority of the governing body then deems best for them.
In these days of impatience with the purposes of a constitution and
of intolerance of minority rights, a look at history is in order. The
majoritarian democracy antics of the French Revolution in its heyday

of liberty, equality, and fraternity, were but a scant improvement on
the imperial orgies of Nero and Caligula. Our founders were well aware
of the grave danger inherent in any governmental process devoid
of con7
stitutional restrictions. Said New Englander John Adams :
76. Mistakes have been. made even at the federal constitutional amendment level. See
U.S. CoNsT. amends. XVIII and XXI, relating to "Prohibition."
77. 10 TnE WORKS OF Jom ADAmS 174 (ed. C. F. Adams 1850-1856).
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The fundamental article of my political creed is, that despotism,
or unlimited sovereignty, or absolute power, is the same in a
majority of a popular assembly, an aristocratical council, an
oligarchical junto, and a single emperor. Equally arbitrary,
cruel, bloody, and in every respect diabolical.
Southerner Thomas Jefferson agreed:78
An elective despotism was not the government we fought for
and again:"
The people, to whom all authority belongs, have divided the
powers of government into two distinct departments, the leading characteristics of which are foreign and domestic; and they
have appointed for each a distinct set of functionaries. These
they have made coordinate, checking and balancing each other,
like the three cardinal departments in the individual States;
each equally supreme as to the powers delegated to itself, and
neither authorized ultimately to decide what belongs to itself,
or to its coparcener in government.
VII. FLORMA CASE LAW
After surveying all the cases interpreting Florida constitutional and
statutory provisions, Patterson presents a summary as of 1953 of the
applicable principles relating to state bonds, to county bonds, and to
municipal bonds.8 0 With the exception of a few minor trends that Patterson anticipated but that were not established law at the time, these prinpiples are still applicable. This indicates not only the soundness of Patterson's analysis, but also a high degree of consistency in the decisions
of our supreme court.
Admittedly some few later cases are difficult to explain, at least when
based on the reasons advanced. For example, one might be puzzled by
a comparison of Tapers v. Pichards' and State v. City of Miami 2 if he
should try to draw a distinction, from the standpoint of public necessity,
between a jail and a stockade. The distinction that one place of confinement has a roof while the other does not is at least somewhat difficult to
grasp. A thorough examination of the opinions, however, shows that the
chief vice of the proposed Miami stockade bond issue, which had not
been submitted for freeholder approval, was that the alleged municipal
authority rested merely on some general borrowing provisions in the
city charter rather than on definite statutory authorization, and that the
78. BASIC WRrriNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131 (Foner ed. 1944).
79. THE WRImTis OF TuoxAS JFFERSON 213-214 (Washington ed. 1855).

80. Patterson, supra note 17, 325-326.
81. 124 Fla. 549, 169 So.2d 39 (1936).
82. 63 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1953).
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so-called "revenue" fund pledged as security for the bonds was the municipal fines and forfeitures fund. By no means could this fund be regarded
as revenue from the operation of the stockade. Furthermore Tapers
rested on a general law antedating in its enactment the constitutional
amendment authorizing freeholder vote.83
The courts, particularly the appellate courts, are not infrequently
criticized for what is in reality a flaw in our system of validating bonds.
As Patterson shrewdly observed, a bond validation proceeding "is not an
efficient substitute for a litigated cause." 84 In the standard situation, the
city attorney, often aided by expert counsel for the bond underwriter
and in any event thoroughly familiar himself with the bond issue, takes
the initiative in upholding the desired issuance by bringing a validation
suit. Against him is the state attorney, whose work is primarily in criminal
law but who is expected to present a vigorous attack on the bond issue
as a piece of uncompensated additional work frequently performed in
haste.
The court, in turn, should not be expected to do the bulk of the
research on the law involved, and it simply cannot take the time or
muster the facilities necessary to dig out the facts for itself. Indeed, at
the appellate level, the court is frowned upon if it roams outside the
record on appeal. Under these circumstances the surprising characteristics of the Florida decisions in this field is their high degree of consistency rather than their few instances of apparent inconsistency, even
though at times considerable disagreement crops out among the members
of the supreme court.8 5
One source of difficulty in deciding what the law is at any given
time is the supreme court's inclination to whittle away at an earlier
decision and opinion, rather than to, recede frankly from the obvious interpretation of its former holding. 6 No one expects perfection, and most
practitioners realize that a court is at times led into error by an inadequate record or an inferior presentation of at least one side of the case.sT
Since the publication of Patterson's article a reasonably accurate
count shows 108 validation proceedings that reached the supreme court,
with 95 of these validated below and only 13 invalidated below. The
83. See FLA. STAT. § 135.01 (1965) and FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
84. Patterson, supra note 17, at 327. See also Watson & Cunningham, supra note 17.
85. See, e.g., Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959), in which
counsel made careful judicial analysis possible by presenting an exceptionally thorough
record on the facts as well as the law.
86. Two recent opinions illustrate the effective manner in which the supreme court
has on occasion clarified the law: Keating v. State, 173 So.2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1965), and
Crownover v. Shannon, 170 So.2d, 299, 301 (Fla. 1964).
87. For a discussion of this point see the remarks made about Adams v. Housing
Authority, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952), in the Grubstein case, supra note 85, at 751, 753, 756,
758-759.
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supreme court reversed 12 lower court validations and 7 lower court
invalidations, or a total of only 19 reversals, for a net of 90 final validations out of the 108 proceedings reaching it in this type of proceeding.
A handful of other cases reached it on proceedings by injunction or
declaratory decree. These figures do not include bond cases raising no
question as to the validity of the bond issuance, and they likewise do not
include cases of per curiam affirmances without opinion of the decree
below, usually a decree validating the issue. These cases would be known
only to an attorney already familiar with the case in the lower court.88
Neither do these figures include the numerous validation proceedings
that never go beyond the circuit court.8 9
An examination of these 108 supreme court opinions indicates the
principles that can, we believe, be summarized for the different levels of
issuer.
A. State Bonds
As regards state bonds, Florida itself cannot issue any general obligation bonds except to suppress insurrection or repel invasion, as provided in Article IX, section 6. Neither of these powers has been called
into play since 1885, when the present constitution was adopted. A state
agency cannot issue bonds secured by tax proceeds otherwise than pursuant to constitutional amendment 0 A state agency can, however, issue
revenue bonds payable solely from the net income of a proposed project
to be constructed with the borrowed money and not from taxes or any
other direct exercise of state power.
B. County Bonds
As regards county bonds, counties may issue bonds for county
purposes as authorized by state statutes, but a freeholder election is
required for issuance of bonds secured wholly or partially by a pledge
of ad valorem taxes. Certain exceptions to this general rule exist, namely,
the issuance of general obligation bonds without freeholder election to
build a courthouse, a jail, and certain other county buildings,9 but the
88. E.g., State v. City of West Palm Beach, 82 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1955), appeal dismissed,
350 U.S. 960 (1956). The bond issue involved a total of $14,000,000 of water and sewerage
revenue bonds.
89. In these instances, in which a serious attack on the bond issue is seldom made or
in which the legal issues raised have already been definitely decided by existing supreme
court decisions, the proponents of the bond issue are content, as a practical matter, with
a circuit court decree followed by lapse of the appeal period without the filing of an appeal.
None of these decisions appear in the reports, of course. See also Watson & Cunningham,
supra note 17.
90. See the 1963 amendment appearing as FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 19. For an opinion
on the 75,000,000 dollars of higher education bonds presented for validation in 1964, see
State v. State Bd. of Educ. 165 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1964).
91. FLA. STAT. § 135.01, still upheld after the subsequent passage of FLA. CONST. art. IX,
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supreme court has refused to extend this exception to cover several other
types of construction or acquisition without freeholder approval.92 Counties may issue revenue bonds for construction of new proprietary projects,
including utilities, provided the only bond security is the security underlying revenue bonds properly so called, namely, confinement of payment
to the revenue of the facility.
Counties may also pledge surplus revenues from other revenue-producing facilities for construction purposes and the revenue of an existing
facility for the purpose of enlarging and expanding it, and as of now the
issuer need not even prove that this revenue is sufficient to pay the operation, maintenance, and debt services costs." Mr. Justice Caldwell takes
the position that validation of revenue bonds without freeholder approval
still necessarily involves a finding that the proposed issue is fiscally
feasible and will not burden the real property of the issuing community
with ad valorem taxes. 4 On the other hand, a majority of the court has
recently taken the position that "the fiscal feasibility of a revenue project
is an administrative decision to be determined by the business judgment
of the issuing agency," and that the judiciary is not responsible for
checking on the fiscal integrity of the proposed project. 5
The supreme court had already refused to upset a revenue bond
issue by the Town of Medley,9" despite the following facts, recognized in
the opinion: that contrary to good business practice the municipality had
not obtained the advice of a fiscal agent; that the initial purchasers of
the bonds drove a hard bargain with the town; that the bonds.were sold
by private sale at a substantial discount and had an unusually high interest rate and other unusual and undesirable features; and that four
types of available excise taxes had been additionally pledged as security.
The fact that the taxpayer can obtain no judicial relief for fiscal absurdity, coupled with the fact that he is not even allowed to 'vote on the
proposed issuance, indicates a strong need for requiring a vote or at least
a thorough fiscal review of the local decision by a state administrative
agency with some knowledge of business, public financing, and particularly debt financing. 7
§ 6; note also

FLA. STAT. § 167.06 (1965), dealing with garbage disposal and also antedating
the freeholder election limitation. This authority was upheld in City of Jacksonville v.
Nichols Eng. & Refresher Corp., 49 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1950), and in City of Jacksonville v.
Savannah Mach. & Foundry Co., 47 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1950).
92. See Madison, supra note 18, for detailed citations relative to voting machines, a
public library, a hospital, school buildings, and rights-of-way for roads.
93. Patterson, supra note 17, at 326, took the position that the issuing county must
submit this proof.
94. Medley v. State, 162 So.2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1964).
95. State v. Manatee County Port Authority, 171 So.2d, 169-171 (1965), with Caldwell,
Drew, and O'Connell, J.J., dissenting.
96. Medley v. State, supra note 94.
97. HmLHOUSE, supra note 10, at 444-446, makes this same review suggestion.
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Pledge of gross revenue of a facility, as distinct from net revenue,
has been approved by our supreme court. 98 In 1963, however, in State
v. Halifax Hosp. Dist.,99 the court admitted that the proposed improvement might well be needed but nevertheless flatly invalidated the issue:' 0
The fact remains, however, that the Constitution requires that
the people who are to pay the bill should be given an opportunity to approve the debt before it is incurred .

. .

. the

people placed this safeguard in the organic law as a protection
to themselves. We did not write the Constitution. We have no
power to tamper with it .

.

.

. under the Constitution we have

no power to substitute our judgment for that of the freeholders.
To do so would be rank usurpation.

The court attempted to distinguish the earlier decisions on the
ground that the bond ordinance challenged in those decisions did not
pledge ad valorem taxes for maintenance and operation to whatever
extent might prove necessary. But from a practical standpoint this is a
distinction without a difference; maintenance and operating costs have
to be met from other available funds, and ad valorem taxes obviously
have to be higher to make up the amount siphoned off from the community revenues for these maintenance and operation costs of the facility.
In any event the law now, despite Halifax, is that all other sources of
revenue except ad valorem taxes can be siphoned off as security for
special obligation bonds without freeholder approval, and the supreme
court will approve no matter how fiscally unsound the project may be.10'
C. Municipal Bonds
As regards municipal bonds, a city or town can issue revenue bonds,
or a mixture of the two, for any public municipal purpose and can pledge
all its operating and tax revenues except ad valorem tax proceeds and
fines and forfeitures without freeholder approval, provided the draftsman
of the bond resolution or ordinance does not make the careless mistake
of contravening Article IX, section 6, openly by pledging ad valorem
taxes specifically, or by failing to exclude them specifically, rather than
indirectly by siphoning off all other municipal revenues. Perhaps this is
98. See discussion by Patterson, supra note 17, at 318-319.
99. State v. Halifax Hosp. Dist. 159 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1963); the full court concurred
in the opinion by Mr. Justice Thornal and in the decision reversing a decree validating
pledge of gross revenues, without freeholder approval, to secure bonds proposed for
building additions to the district hospital.
100. Id. at 235.
101. Medley v. State, supra note 94, decided after the Halifax case, supra note 99. It
certainly appears that the court has no intention of complying with the principles announced in the Halifax case and quoted above, provided the draftsman of the ordinance
takes care to make the circumvention of freeholder approval indirect rather than direct.
This can readily be done by merely inserting in the bond ordinance a provision that the
pledge does not include ad valorem taxes.
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as it should be, but at least Florida citizens should know where they
stand under the latest supreme court decisions.
A municipality can protect itself from profligate debt financing by
specific borrowing limitations in its charter, but it is not now required to
do so, and only a few city charters require referendum approval for a
pledge of a portion or all of the city revenues other than ad valorem tax
proceeds. A good example of a decision involving a special-act charter
provision specifically requiring freeholder approval of special tax revenue
certificates appears in State v. City of Boca Raton10 2 in which the court
upheld the requirement imposed by this charter provision and reversed
the decree validating the bonds.'0 3
D. Special Assessment District Bonds
One other type of district must be mentioned: the special assessment
district. Prior freeholder approval is not essential to issuance of special
drainage district bonds payable solely from special assessments levied
against the properties within the district in proportion to benefits assessed
by the drainage commissioners. 4 The same type of conclusion had been
reached earlier in City of Orlando v. State0 5 once the court was satisfied
that no pledge of municipal ad valorem taxes was involved.
Whether a limited group of property holders should be forced, without any say in the matter, to undergo and pay entirely for supposed
102. 172 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1965).
103. For another example of strict charter restrictions, see §§ 8.01(3) and 8.03(2) of
the West Palm Beach charter, enacted as ch. 65-2381, Laws of Fla. Spec. Acts (1965),
subject to referendum at which the voters adopted the charter.
104. State v. Dixie Drainage Dist., 167 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1964), involving FLA. STAT.
ch. 298 (1965). The manuscript of this article was completed in early May 1966, and its
authors have not attempted to analyze decisions rendered thereafter, but a relatively new
Florida situation of practical importance has just come to the fore judicially in what might
functionally be termed urban downtown special assessment districts. Accordingly we call
attention to State v. Downtown Development Authority, decided by the supreme court as
Case No. 35, 395 on Oct. 12, 1966. As of this writing the fifteen-day period for filing a petition
for rehearing has not expired, and we accordingly refrain from any criticism of the slip copy
of the opinion, from which Thornal, C.J., and Roberts and Ervin, J.J., dissented without
opinion. The circuit court had entered a decree purporting to validate a 17,500-dollar note
of the Development Authority, as well as the relevant population act enacted as ch. 65-1090,
Laws of Fla. (1965) and also the levy, without any referendum, of a half-mill ad valorem
tax on property within the Development Area. While § 11 of the act authorized a development authority to levy such a tax, the Miami Development Authority had not done so
when it adopted the resolution authorizing issuance of the note. Furthermore, the resolution
expressly limited the source of note payment to funds derived from this additional tax,
"if and when . . .actually levied and collected," and expressly negated any obligatior of
the City to levy the additional tax or to pay sums from any funds other than the proceeds
of this tax, if levied. The supreme court held that the resolution had not created a binding
obligation, that a proceeding under Fla. Stat. ch. 75 (1965) could not be used to attempt
validation of this type of action, and that the decree below "constituted an invalid exercise
of the judicial power of the circuit court." It accordingly reversed with directions to dismiss
the petition for validation.
105. 67 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1953).
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improvements that they do not want, is certainly debatable. If the property of all the owners in the community cannot be subjected to ad valorem
taxes without their consent, the argument that a certain few of them can
be so taxed without consent is hardly logical.
A good example of the lengths to which unscrupulous politicians
and their greedy supporters will go in attempting to seize authority, apparently without any qualms, is well illustrated in Rafkin v. City of
Miami Beach'1° in which the city seriously impaired the value of residential property by widening an adequate existing street and then tried
to make the abutting owners pay for the impairment caused by the diversion of heavy traffic into this residential area. Even so, the supreme court
checked this outrageous scheme by only a four-member majority. Regardless of the desirability of allowing the owners of property allegedly
benefited in a special way to vote on whether they want the special benefits, the Florida law is clear: the affected owners are barred from voting
on the issue.
E. Industrial Aid Bonds
Another major cause of bond issuance litigation concerns the matter
of public purpose, which is' °7 frequently coupled with the issue of aid to
private enterprises by pledge of public credit. Analysis of the most recent
cases on this point indicates that services traditionally listed for well
over a century as essential, such as courts, courthouses, jails, police
protection, fire protection, and city halls or other central administrative
quarters, constitute public purposes. In addition, urban slum clearance
is a public purpose, °8 improvement of transportation terminals, such as
airports, seaports and inland water ports, is now a public purpose, 0 9
and recreational facilities are public purposes." 0 Ten years"' ago Professor Alloway shrewdly observed the peculiarity of the doctrine that
expenditures for "play" are permissible but expenditures merely for
providing an opportunity to make a living are not."' If a recreational
facility is leased for operation entirely to private enterprise the purpose
106. 38 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1949).
107. See Tew, Industrial Bond Financing and The Florida Public Purpose Doctrine,
20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 171 (1966).
108. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
109. E.g., State v. Manatee County Port Authority, 171 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1964); Wiggins v. City of Green Cove Springs, 159 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1963).
110. State v. Daytona Beach Racing Recreation Facilities Dist., 89 So.2d 34 (Fla.
1956).
111. Alloway, Constitutional Law, 10 U. MIAmi L. R v. 143, 157 (1956); 12 U. MIA.n
L. REV. 288, 304 (1958); cited by C. Robert Burns, former city attorney of West Palm
Beach, in Municipal, State & County Securities, 17 FLA. LAW & PRACTICE 458 (1962).
112. State v. Washington County Dev. Auth., 178 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1965); a public
housing project to build homes and sell to private individuals for their own use is not related
to public health, public safety, public morals, or public welfare (unless in a municipality),
and it is not essential to recreation.
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is still public,"' and this principle applies even though the importance
of recreation and entertainment to the economy of a tourist state such
as Florida has been judicially recognized." 4
On the other hand, in rural areas the public construction of lowcost housing in a depressed area for sale to private owners desirous of
residing there, even when part of an overall master plan to rehabilitate
the area, is not a public purpose." 5 By the same token, the use of industrial revenue bonds to construct a plastics factory for lease to a new
private enterprise willing to come into the area and provide needed
employment is not for a public purpose, even when but a small part of
an overall plan to develop a depressed rural area." 6 Taken by itself, the
building of a plastics factory is primarily for the benefit of the private
enterprise proposed as lessee. On the other hand, the leasing of the
entire repair and maintenance facilities for aircraft at a county airport
to a private enterprise for profit is a public purpose, since this project
helps transportation facilities, and revenue bonds payable solely from
rent by the lessee can properly be issued." The supreme court leans
heavily on the quantitative test whenever benefit to a private enterprise
is involved. But the court has, of late, wavered in determining what is and
what is not incidental, between a realistic examination of the overall plan
and an isolated consideration of one step of the plan.
Tremendous pressure is being put on the supreme court to authorize
industrial aid bonds without a constitutional amendment; and there is
much to be said for the view that, if a legislative body at the state,
county, or city level conclusively establishes the existence of community
benefit and public purpose by securing increased employment opportunity, and if the judiciary therefore sanctions the issuance of industrial
aid bonds to assist an incoming private enterprise, then sections 7 and
10 of Article IX will have been virtually repealed from the bench.
We cannot discuss in detail the lengthy subject of industrial aid
bonds in an article of this scope, but those interested will find a well
written analysis of the more recent Florida cases in Industrial Development Bonds: Judicial Construction vs. Plant Construction,"8 and a
thorough treatment of the entire controversy in INDUSTRIAL BOND
FINANCING." 9 This treatise presents the history of industrial development bonds, the major decisions throughout the country, the arguments
113. See note 110 supra.
114. See concurring opinion of Thornal, J., in Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency
115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
115. See note 112 supra.
116. State v. Clay County Dev. Auth., 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962).
117. State v. Okaloosa County Airport & Ind. Auth., 168 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964).
118. Note, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 262 (1962).
119. Published in 1965 by Goodbody & Co., under the research and editorial direction
of Alan B. Lechner.
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for and against the use of these bonds, the effects of their use upon industry and upon the communities issuing them, and their interaction with
the bond market, plus some well formulated conclusions, recommendations, and proposals.
This volume is recommended to anyone seriously considering the
authorization of the issuance of industrial aid bonds, but he should note
the danger that feudal authorities may seize upon this type of public bond,
the primary advantage of which is the exemption of its interest from income taxation, as an excuse to subject to income tax all municipal bond interest. This would destroy the major practicable source of local debt
financing and accomplish what appears to be the modern federal goal of
making all state and local government financing completely dependent
upon federal aid. 2 °
The 1965 legislature in Florida refused to pass HJR 1212 proposing a constitutional amendment permitting local governments to incur
debt for industrial, agricultural, or trade development.1 2'
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Thirty-three years ago a host of questions about bond defaults were
laid before the Municipal Finance Officers Association. The causes,
amounts, past and present, geographical distribution, losses to creditors,
effects on municipal credit, and remedies-all were disturbing matters
to the public officials of that depression period. In 1936, Dr. Hillhouse,
the Association's Director of Research, wrote his outstanding treatise
analyzing the mistakes and summing up the answers to those and other
questions.
It is both interesting and informative to review today the conclusions on these matters reached thirty years ago by Dr. Hillhouse during
the depths of the depression. He observed:. 2 2
Before the next period of prosperity disrupts our thinking and
before the lessons of the last several years have been forgotten,
municipal finance specialists should concentrate on how to prevent a recurrence of the present plight. It must be remembered
that a decade or two hence there will have been almost a complete turnover of local debt administrators. The new generation
in control will know little or nothing of past lessons unless they
are written concretely into new principles and practices.
120. The Kiplinger Tax Letter, Apr. 29, 1966, p. 4, refers to the fact that Rep. Byrnes
has introduced a bill providing that an industry leasing a plant financed by industrial aid
bonds must pay income tax on the difference between fair rental value and lower rental
charged by the lessor municipality.
121. Fla. Munic. Record, July 1965, p. 31.
122. HILLHOUSE, supra note 10, at 441.
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Some of the highlights revealed as of that time were:

23

1. Defaults had occurred on every type of bond.
2. Defaults were not restricted to any one section of the country. (New
England escaped with the lowest number of defaults while the
South and Midwest suffered the greatest number of defaults.)
3. Municipal defaults have been a recurrent phenomenon in the hun,
dred-year period studied, 1835-1935.
4. Losses to bondholders upon defaulted bonds have been relatively
negligible when compared either with the total amount of bonds
outstanding at any one time or with total amount of bonds in default within any given period.
5. Impairment of a municipality's future credit rating is one of the
very serious consequences of a default.
6. States have generally "muddled through" the problems created by
municipal defaults.
7. Permanent administrative machinery, when established to cope
with municipal defaults, has proved its worth.
8. Defaults result mainly from failure to maintain a proper ratio between fixed debt charges, current operating expenses, and revenues.
9. The accumulation of too heavy an inflexible debt service in boom
years is a prime factor in causing defaults.
10. Most of the overborrowing was due to the use of municipal credit
in aid of real estate speculation and overdevelopment. The misuse
of municipal credit by private enterprise was even then an old story.
11. Municipal credit and real estate speculation must be divorced.
12. The development of sounder practices in debt administration is
imperative.
13. More effective debt limits must be adopted, and the problem of overlapping debts faced up to and solved.
14. Adequate state administrative supervision over local debt practices
should be developed.
Offering recommendations as to the contents or, alternatively, the
complete elimination of constitutional provisions on public bond financing
is a risky venture at best. We suggest the following principles with the
full realization that disagreement exists as to what provisions of this
type should be.
As regards state bonds we suggest that limitations on issuance by
the state be included, but that the 1885 restrictions be liberalized so as
to minimize the necessity for sporadic amendments, the use of special
state agencies primarily for the purpose of issuing bonds that the state
itself cannot issue, the resort to lease-rental agreements, and the use of
123. Id. at 471-482.
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long-term interagency lending." 4 We suggest that the state should be
permitted to issue capital outlay bonds for construction and expansion
of the necessary state office buildings, for acquisition of sites and construction of plant and facilities for the state university system and
junior colleges,' 25 and for building state highways, with this last type of
bond being subject to mandatory statewide referendum if proposed above
a certain limit in any fiscal year. The power to issue state bonds for the
two purposes presently authorized should be retained.
As regards county, city, and special district bonds, we are not convinced that the relatively heavy use of revenue bonds in Florida has been
detrimental or has caused any substantial additional expense to the
borrowers; on the contrary, we recommend continued predominant use
of revenue bonds without mandatory referendum when the bonds are
true revenue bonds as previously defined in this article.'2 6
As regards general obligation bonds, we suggest elimination of the
provision requiring that a majority of the registered freeholders vote on
the proposed issuance. Any eligible voter should be encouraged to vote.
This restriction, however, actually encourages many voters to stay away
from the polls as a means of defeating issuance. Every voter should be
encouraged to express his opinion one way or the other. On the other
hand, we recommend repairing the sabotage of Article IX, section 6, performed by the supreme court in Lersch v. Board of Public Instruction,'27
in which the court looked exclusively at the technical wording of Article
IX, section 6, formulated at a time when no one was even aware that a
specially privileged, non-taxable class of real property owners would be
created in our state. Those asked to bear all of the risks and ultimate
responsibility by themselves should be allowed to make the decision on
this type of bond issuance, and those too irresponsible to shoulder any
of the load, though still expecting a substantial amount of the benefits,
should not be allowed to insist that their neighbor carry his own load
and theirs too. The "Sarasota Plan," under which for purposes of defraying public school 'costs the first 2,000 dollars of assessed value is not
exempt but the next 5,000 dollars is exempt, 2

8

is the least that should

be done in this connection. The best plan would be to eliminate homestead tax exemption entirely as regards taxation for operating the public
schools. From the standpoint of taxation the owner of the more valuable
property bears a heavier load than the owner of less valuable property
124. For a penetrating criticism of inter-agency lending see HmNs,

supra note 5, at

76-81.

125. If constitutional authority were provided for regional multi-county districts
authorized to issue capital outlay bonds for junior colleges, this solution might be preferable.
126. See supra text DEFINITIONS.
127. 121 Fla. 261, 164 So.281 (1935).
128. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7, as now worded; it includes this amendment for
Sarasota County adopted in 1964.
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anyway. The important point is that all property owners allowed to vote
on imposing the risk should be made to realize that in imposing it they
bear at least some small part of it themselves. The same reasoning applies
to Article XII, section 17. In fact, the risk argument applies to every
type of general obligation bond. The tax exemption logically has nothing
to do with the question of who should vote on the imposition of all the
risk.
We recommend that some millage limit be retained on ad valorem
property taxation, although the ten-mill minimum for county school tax
probably should be raised.' 2 9 While we do not believe that issuance
of revenue bonds should require a referendum, the siphoning off of
all revenue other than ad valorem tax revenue without referendum,
which has been the curse of some of the smaller communities controlled
by irresponsible and incompetent city councils, is a ruinous process for
the community involved and should be stopped. Since the courts have
washed their hands of the fiscal feasibility issue,'30 some state or regional
agency competent to check financial matters and able to approach the
problem without bias might well be given this supervisory task. The
initiative for proposing an issue should remain with the local governing
authorities. Alternatively, a referendum by all the voters of the issuing
community could be required for issuance of special obligation bonds and
hybrid bonds. In other words, only issues of revenue bonds properly so
called should be permitted without referendum. The indications that
Florida voters, particularly municipal voters, are inclined to approve
more issues than they disapprove, even under the present limited system
of referendums, does not mean that their disapprovals are unimportant.1' 1
The tendency to approve is shown by the national figures also. 12 The
argument sometimes heard that referendums cost a lot of money is not
factually supported in Florida." 3
With the growing revival of interest in local government (a good
sign, we submit) perhaps the best solution would be to require a refer129. CI. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 8, § 17.
130. This remark is not meant to imply that the responsibility for this type of decision
should be placed on the judiciary.
131. Since 1960, to the personal knowledge of the authors, Palm Beach County freeholders approved issuance of 26,750,000 dollars of county school bonds, this being the only
issue proposed to them since then. The city of West Palm Beach has since 1960 approved
4,500,000 dollars of general obligation bonds for various public improvements, these being
the only general obligation bonds proposed within this period. In the only general obligation
bonds issue proposed to the voters of the Town of South Palm Beach since 1960 they
approved the issuance of 170,000 dollars of bonds for sewer and water line installations.
132. GOODBODY, supra note 27, at 23.
133. The usual cost of a referendum in a city as large as West Palm Beach, with a
population of over 60,000, runs only between 1,200 dollars and 1,500 dollars when held in
conjunction with a general election. The cost of holding a special referendum in a city this
size would only be approximately 3,500 dollars. An amount of this size is a small price to
pay for insurance against the mistakes that even the best of local governmental leaders make

at times.
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endum by all municipal voters or by all county voters, as the case may
be, on special obligation or hybrid bonds, unless the city or metro charter
expressly provides otherwise, or unless the legislature by statute exempts
a particular county from this requirement. In this way the elimination
of the requirement would at least be given a careful consideration.
The matter of setting total debt limits on the basis of percentage of
assessed valuation, or on the basis of the average of recent operating
budgets over a given period, or by some method other than a fixed
dollar amount, 3 4 should be left to the municipality to provide in its
charter if it so chooses.
Serious consideration should also be given to the matter of allowing
those property owners paying all of the tax and taking all of the risk to
vote on whether the proposed public benefits to their property to be
financed by special assessments should be conferred. If what is proposed
is really a special benefit to the property in a particular area, then by
the very nature of this classification the citizens of other areas of the
community should not be concerned in the matter. Those about to be
benefited should be assumed to have enough intelligence to consider
whether they want the benefits at the cost figure proposed, and if they
cannot afford the cost they should not be forced to take the benefits. In
this connection we point out that the homestead tax exemption, by its
terms, does not apply to assessments for special benefits. 1 5 The same
reasoning applies to special districts lying entirely or partially outside
municipalities.
We recommend provisions barring the issuance of public industrial
aid bonds, in view of the wavering of the supreme court on this matter.
In summary, although few would deny that our present state constitution is sadly in need of revision, with respect both to the internal organization of its contents and to a due regard for the English language,
the fact remains that the existing debt-financing provisions have worked
quite well in practice." 6 We do not believe that sweeping changes are
necessary. Some few changes would be salutary, however, and we trust
that this article may have indicated the reasons.
134. A fixed dollar limit is becoming a very unstable yardstick by reason of the constant and rapid devaluation of the dollar over the past several years, a process controlled
entirely by the federal government. The limitation standard should definitely not be pegged
to the national currency, in our opinion.
135. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
136. The reader, if he gets this far, may say that we have taken a long time to say so,
but we did make a sincere effort to approach the problems without preconceived notions
other than a strong belief in our system of constitutional democracy, coupled with the
corollary belief that state and local governments should be strengthened and preserved from
further encroachment and usurpation by the federal government. The removal in any government of the active and effective participation by the governed has invariably been the
sign of a sick polity on its way out.

1966]

PUBLIC BOND FINANCING

35

Robie Mitchell, a nationally respected municipal bond attorney with
a firsthand knowledge of the Florida problems, recently defined civilization as "the condition in which one generation pays the last generation's
debt by issuing bonds for the next generation to pay."' 37 In a more serious
vein he stated that his real fear was opening the gates to excessive borrowing and thereby bringing on another era of municipal defaults. We
concur.
The constitutional revision committee has a most difficult task, and
the Prophet Isaiah might well have had them in mind when he proclaimed: 138

Thou art wearied in the multitude of thy counsels. Let now the
astrologers, the stargazers, the monthly prognosticators, stand
up, and save thee from these things that shall come upon thee.
137. Constitutional Limitations on The Incurring of Debt, an address delivered before
the Section on Local Gov't Law, A.B.A., Aug. 1964.
138. The Book of Isaiah 47:13.

